The Dark Side of Packet Capture
Pretty much anything you can discover through packet capture can be discovered by anyone else using packet capture in a similar manner. Moreover, some technologies that were once thought to be immune to packet capture, such as switches, are not as safe as once believed. Make sure the Dark Side stays with you by reading this excerpt from the O'Reilly book, Network Troubleshooting Tools.
Network Troubleshooting Tools
by Joseph D. Sloan
1.7. Dark Side of Packet Capture
What you can do, others can do. Pretty much anything you can discover through packet capture can be discovered by anyone else using packet capture in a similar manner. Moreover, some technologies that were once thought to be immune to packet capture, such as switches, are not as safe as once believed.
1.7.1. Switch Security
Switches are often cited as a way to protect traffic from sniffing. And they really do provide some degree of protection from casual sniffing. Unfortunately, there are several ways to defeat the protection that switches provide.
First, many switches will operate as hubs, forwarding traffic out on every port, whenever their address tables are full. When first initialized, this is the default behavior until the address table is built. Unfortunately, tools like macof, part of the dsniff suite of tools, will flood switches with MAC addresses overflowing a switch's address table. If your switch is susceptible, all you need to do to circumvent security is run the program.
Second, if two machines have the same MAC address, some switches will forward traffic to both machines. So if you want copies of traffic sent to a particular machine on your switch, you can change the MAC address on your interface to match the target devices' MAC address. This is easily done on many Unix computers with the ifconfig command.
A third approach, sometimes called ARP poisoning, is to send a forged ARP packet to the source device. This can be done with a tool like arpredirect, also part of dsniff. The idea is to substitute the packet capture device's MAC address for the destination's MAC address. Traffic will be sent to a packet capture device, which can then forward the traffic to its destination. Of course, the forged ARP packets can be sent to any number of devices on the switch.
The result, with any of these three techniques, is that traffic will be copied to a device that can capture it. Not all switches are susceptible to all of these attacks. Some switches provide various types of port security including static ARP assignments. You can also use tools like arpwatch to watch for suspicious activities on your network. (arpwatch is described in .) If sniffing is a concern, you may want to investigate what options you have with your switches.
While these techniques could be used to routinely capture traffic as part of normal management, the techniques previously suggested are preferable. Flooding the address table can significantly degrade network performance. Duplicating a MAC address will allow you to watch traffic only to a single host. ARP poisoning is a lot of work when monitoring more than one host and can introduce traffic delays. Consequently, these aren't really techniques that you'll want to use if you have a choice.